ESSAY
PREEMPTION, AGENCY COST THEORY, AND PREDATORY LENDING BY BANKING
AGENTS: ARE FEDERAL REGULATORS BITING OFF MORE THAN THEY CAN CHEW?
Christopher L. Peterson*
I. INTRODUCTION
A pitched battle is currently being waged for control of the American banking
industry. For over a hundred years, the federal and state governments have maintained a
complex, but relatively stable truce in their contest for power. At the beginning of our
republic, state governments were the primary charterers and regulators of banks. In the
wake of the Civil War, the National Bank Act created parity between federal and state
banks, cementing the notion of a “dual banking system” that endured through the
twentieth century. But in the past five years, the federal government has become
esurient, using its powers under the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution to cut a
new, wider footprint of authority for federal banking regulators and for banks that rally
to their banner. A series of controversial federal regulations have preempted the
application of state consumer protection laws directed at prevention of “predatory
lending” by national banks and thrifts. These regulations are controversial not merely
because the recent rash of fraudulent, deceptive, and unconscionable lending has had a
corrosive effect on minority communities, senior citizens, and the entire lower middle
class. Rather, they are also controversial because democratically elected state
representatives all across the country had responded to their constituents’ demands by
adopting such legislation, and no federal statute ever explicitly authorized the unelected
beltway banking custodians to dismiss these state consumer protection laws.1 In
*
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In the case of home mortgage loans approximately forty states, counties, and municipalities
have adopted predatory lending laws attempting to protect homeowners from predatory mortgage brokers
and lenders. State laws include: Arkansas Home Loan Protection Act, ARK. CODE. ANN. §§ 25-53-101 et
seq.; CAL. FIN. CODE §§ 4970-4979.7 (West 2003); Consumer Equity Protection Act, COL. STAT. § 5-3.5201 et seq.; Connecticut Abusive Home Loan Lending Practices Act, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 36a746-747, 754 ; Home Loan Protection Act, D.C. CODE § 26.1151.01 et seq.; Fair Lending Act, FLA.
STAT. ANN. §§ 494.0079-.00797; Georgia Fair Lending Act, GA. CODE ANN. §§ 7-6A-1 et seq. (as
amended); Idaho House Bill 28, ID. Stat. § 26-3103 et seq.; High Risk Home Loan Act Ill. Comp. Stat.
§§ 137/1-137/175; Indiana Home Loan Practices Act, Ind. Code §§ 24-9-4-1 et seq.; Consumer Credit
Code, Kan. Stat. Ann. §§ 16a-1-101 et seq.; High Cost Home Loan Act, KY. Rev. Stat. § 360.100; Truth
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fairness, federal regulators have levied persuasive arguments justifying their decisions
as necessary in an increasingly national financial services marketplace. In their view, as
technology shrinks our world the notion of fifty different banking jurisdictions is
quaint, inefficient, and perhaps even silly. Would it not save everyone a lot of time and
trouble if we had only one set of laws to govern the banking industry?
In a recent article I observed that the political economy driving federal
preemption of state banking regulation has a tendency to magnify the effect of
preemptive action.2 Because federal banks, state banks, thrifts, credit unions, and nondepository lenders all act in the same zero-sum competitive environment, political
shelter for one type of institution is a direct threat to every other type. When the
regulatory patrons of one type of institution act to relax the regulatory constraints of
their members, rival patrons must respond, or risk losing their regulatory turf as the
institutions they represent lose market share or shift their assets into better protected
(read: less regulated) charters. This dynamic guarantees that even narrow federal efforts
to preempt state law will creep.3 In nearly thirty years since the Supreme Court’s
decision in Marquette National Bank v. First of Omaha Corporation4 preemptive
in Lending, Me. Rev. Stat. Titl 9-A, §§ 8-101 et seq.; X (Maryland); Massachusetts Predatory Home
Loan Practices Act, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 183C, §§ 1 et seq.; MICH. COMP. LAWS. ANN. Ch. 445, §§
1631-1645 (Michigan); Nevada Assembly Bill No. 284, Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 598D.010 et seq.; New Jersey
Home Ownership Security Act of 2002, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 46:10B-22 et seq.; Home Loan Protection
Act, N.M. REV. STAT. §§ 58-21A-1 et seq.; N.Y. BANKING LAW § 6-L (McKinney 2003) (New York);
Restrictions and Limitations on High Cost Home Loans, N.C. Gen Stat. §§ 24-1.1E et seq.; Ohio H.B.
386, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1349.25- 1349.39; Consumer Credit Code, 14A OKL. ST. § 79.0404.;
Omnibus Mortgage Bankers and Brokers and Consumer Equity Protection Act, 63 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§§ 456.501- 456.524 (2003); Sough Carolina High Cost and Consumer Home Loans Act, S.C. Code Ann.
§§ 37-23-10 et seq.; Tex. Fin. Code § 343.001 et seq.; X (Utah); West Virginia Residential Mortgage
Lender, Broker, and Servicer Act, W.VA. CODE ANN. §§ 31-17-1 et seq.; WIS. STAT. §§ 428.101 428.211 (2004) (Wisconsin); X (Wyoming). Local ordinances include: s18 Chicago, Ill., Municipal Code
of Chicago, Predatory Lending Ordinance §§ 2-32-4545, 2-92-325, 4-4-155, 8-4-325 So2000-2145 of
2000 (Aug. 8, 30, 2000); PROTECTION FROM PREDATORY LENDING AND MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE
IMPROVEMENTS ACT OF 2002, 48 D.C. REG. 3505 (2001); PHILADELPHIA, PA., PROHIBITION AGAINST
PREDATORY LENDING, PHILADELPHIA CODE §§ 9-2400 to 9-2408 et seq (April 9, 2001); DAYTON, OH.,
ORDINANCE 29990-01 (July 11, 2001) (codified at REV. CODE OF GEN. ORDINANCES §§ 112.40-.44);
ATLANTA, GA., ORDINANCE 01-O-0843 (June 6, 2001) (codified at CODE OF ORDINANCES §§ 58-100 to 102); OAKLAND, CA., ORDINANCE 12361 C.M.S. (October 2, 2001); CLEVELAND, OH., ORDINANCE 73702 (March 4, 2002), amended at Ordinance 45-03 (April 22, 2002); TOLEDO, OH., ANTI-PREDATORY
LENDING ORDINANCE, 291-02 (Nov. 5, 2002).; LOS ANGELES, CAL., CAL. FIN. CODE DIVISION §§ 1.6 et
seq. (December 18, 2002).
2

Christopher L. Peterson, Federalism and Predatory Lending: Unmasking the Deregulatory
Agenda, 78 TEMPLE L. REV. 1, 72 (2005).
3

Id. at 72-73.

4

439 U.S. 229 (1978).
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actions have almost without exception crept out to cover more and more commercial
activity.5 The result has been a steady, silent, deregulatory trend.
One the most recent manifestations of this preemption creep has been federal
banking regulators’ efforts to extend immunity from state law to the agents of federal
depository institutions. These efforts have generated somewhat less commentary than
one might expect. For, once federal regulators attempted to preempt most state law and
oversight for operating subsidiaries, preemption for agents of depository institutions
seemed less surprising. Of what little has been written on this subject, most scholars
have analyzed the legality of the regulatory action. But, the preemption creep also
produces the following questions: did Congress authorize the Office of Thrift
Supervision and/or the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency to preempt state law
with respect to bank agents?, may the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation preempt
state regulation of some state banking activities, including a state’s regulation of an outof-state bank’s state licensed agent?, and would five justices on the recently
reconstituted Supreme Court agree that a federal banking regulator can preempt state
regulation of state licensed agents of a state chartered bank? While these are certainly
questions that merit attention, this essay focuses instead on the advisability of federal
preemption of state regulation of agents of depository institutions as a policy matter. In
particular, this article explores whether economic theory on the relationship between a
principle and an agent may hold some useful insights for those pondering the ideal
scope of federal preemption of state regulation of depository institutions. Economists
and legal scholars have long explored the costs and benefits of agency in a variety of
different contexts.6 For example, a significant body of research has developed using
agency cost modeling to shed light on corporate law and the nature of the firm.7 In
5

My metaphor is by no means the only one. Others have called this process, or at least parts of
it, as the perpetuation of a grand illusion, James J. White, The Usury Trompe l’Oeil, 51 S.C. L. REV. 445,
(2000), and as an amazing ever expanding elastic rubber band, Elizabeth R. Schiltz, The Amazing,
Elastic, Ever-Expanding Exportation Doctrine and its Effect on Predatory Lending Regulation, 88 MINN.
L. REV. 518 (2004).
6

For influential introductions to the application of agency cost theory to law, see Kenneth J.
Arrow, The Economics of Agency, in PRINCIPALS AND AGENTS: THE STRUCTURE OF BUSINESS 37 (John
W. Pratt & Richard J. Zeckhauser eds., 1985); Kathleen M. Eisenhardt, Agency Theory: An Assessment
and Review, 14 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 57 (1989); Stanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, An Analysis of
the Principal-Agent Problem, 51 ECONOMETRICA 7 (1983); JEAN-JAQUES LAFFONT & DAVID MRTIMORT,
THE THEORY OF INCENTIVES: THE PRINCIPAL-AGENT MODEL (2002); Eric Posner, Agency Models in Law
and Economics, in CHICAGO LECTURES IN LAW AND ECONOMICS 225 (Eric A. Posner, ed., 2000); and
Stephen A. Ross, The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principals Problem, 63 AM. ECON. REV. 134
(1973).
7

See, e.g., Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial
Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308 (1976) (landmark paper
discussing the “nexus of contracts” theory of the firm and highlighting the importance of agency
relationships in analyzing it).
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particular agency cost theory has been applied to issues such as regulation of middle
management,8 insider trading,9 and the executive compensation.10 Legal scholars have
also found interesting applications for agency cost theory in jurisprudence,11 criminal
sentencing,12 antitrust,13 securities,14trusts and estates,15 and tax law.16 These theoretical
questions are considered in the context of the ongoing predatory lending controversy
which continues to rage in the nation’s press, courts, and legislatures.
Part II of this article provides a brief introductory sketch of the predatory
lending problem and recent legal developments concerning federal preemption of state
authority to address that problem. Part III delivers an exposition of agency cost theory.
Part IV applies those theories to the financial institution context. This section explores
whether agents of depository institutions will have the same incentives to avoid
predatory behavior as depository institutions themselves. And, it queries whether
federal regulators are prepared to deal with any such disparities in those incentives
without the assistance of state law enforcement. Part V offers brief concluding remarks.

8

Michael J. Meurer, Law, Economics, and the Theory of the Firm, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 727, 728-29

(2004).
9

Dennis W. Carlton & Daniel R. Fischel, The Regulation of Insider Trading, 35 STAN. L. REV.
857, 896-72 (1982-83).
10

Lucian Arye Bebchuck et al., Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of
Executive Compensation, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 751 (2002); William J. Carney, Controlling Management
Opportunism in the Market for Corporate Control: An Agency Cost Model, 1988 Wisc. L. Rev. 385;
Kevin J. Murphy, Executive Compensation, in 3B HANDBOOK OF LABOR ECONOMICS 2485 (Orley
Ashenfelter & David Cards eds., 1999); Tod Perry & Mark Zenner, CEO Compensation in the 19990s:
Shareholder Alignment or Shareholder Expropriation?, 35 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 123 (2000).
11

Linz Audain, Judicial Selection, and an Agency Cost Model of the Judicial Function, 42 AM.
U.L. REV. 115 (1992).
12

Kenneth Dau-Schmidt, An Agency Cost Analysis of the Sentencing Reform Act: Recalling the
Virtues of Delegating Complex Decisions, 25 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 659 (1992).
13

Bruce H. Kobayashi, Antitrust, Agency, and Amnesty: An Economic Analysis of the Criminal
Enforcement of the Antitrust Laws Against Corporations, 69 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 715 (2001).
14

Claire A. Hill, Securitization: A Low-Cost Sweetener for Lemons, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 1061,
1094-1100 (1996).
15

Robert H. Sitkoff, An Agency Costs Theory of Trust Law, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 621 (2004).

16

Joseph A. Snoe, The Entity Tax and Corporate Integration: An Agency Cost Analysis and a
Call for a Deferred Distributions Tax, 48 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1 (1993).
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II. BACKGROUND: THE INTERSECTION OF TWO CONTROVERSIES
A. Predatory Lending In an Era of Financial Deregulation
Policymakers in all civilizations must face difficult choices about the extent to
which public institutions will intervene in credit markets on behalf of debtors.
Throughout most of the twentieth century, American consumer credit law was generally
rather skeptical of creditors who deployed harsh terms and practices in the origination
and collection of consumer debts.17 For example, most states had usury laws which
provided some upper limit on pricing of small loans.18 And, federal bankruptcy
protections chastised overreaching creditors by giving consumers the possibility of a
fresh start.19 Moreover, particularly beginning in the mid-1960s, a series of consumer
protection initiatives at both the federal and state level were enacted, facilitating a
historically unprecedented public confidence in and acceptance of consumer borrowing.
However, during the 1980s and largely continuing today, the trend against public
intervention in credit markets took force.
A large number of commentators have complained that neglect and relaxation of
consumer protection statutes has emboldened a portion of the personal finance industry
to engage in a variety of abusive, misleading, and unfair practices loosely grouped
under the term “predatory lending.” In general, even the staunchest critics of consumer
protection statutes have conceded that a predatory lending problem of some sort exists,
although which loans and practices should qualify as such remains a matter of great
debate.20
17

CHRISTOPHER L. PETERSON, TAMING THE SHARKS: TOWARDS A CURE FOR THE HIGH COST
CREDIT MARKET 76-111 (2004); Christopher Peterson, Truth, Understanding, and High Cost Consumer
Credit: The Historical Context of the Truth-in-Lending Act, 55 FLA. L. REV. 807 (2003).
18

BARBARA A. CURRAN, TRENDS IN CONSUMER CREDIT LEGISLATION 15-16 (1965)

19

Peterson, Historical Context of Truth-in-Lending, supra note , at 866.

20

While the purpose of this short article is not to carefully define the parameters of what loans
are predatory, there are widely accepted and historically grounded benchmarks upon which a discussion
can proceed. For example, in the small loan market, most states continue to retain small loan interest rate
caps on their books—although a variety of exceptions have rendered the caps frequently unenforceable.
Also, the United States code treats loans at above 45% as a per se evidentiary factor of extortionate
criminal loan sharking. 18 U.S.C. § 892(b)(2) (2006). Historically, many ancient governments have
capped interest rates at between 20 and 36 percent. PETERSON, TAMING THE SHARKS, supra note , at 5161. In the market for home mortgages many states have passed laws which come up with a recipe of
terms which can combine to create a predatory loan. See Baher Azmy, Squaring the Predatory Lending
Circle, 57 FLA. L. REV. 295 (2005) (summarizing state predatory mortgage lending statutes); Peterson,
Federalism and Predatory Lending, supra note , 61-68 (same). To some extent, the Home Ownership and
Equity Protection Act was the progenitor of this approach. In other credit markets such as those for home
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Much of the predatory lending market has been served by non-depository
creditors. Traditionally, pawnshops, payday lenders, “buy here-pay here” car
dealerships, and rent-to-own financiers have had no relationship with depository
institutions. Accordingly, federal and state banking regulators have understandably seen
much of the troubling developments in predatory “fringe” markets as a problem outside
their jurisdiction, and better addressed by attorneys general, law enforcement, and
private litigation.21 But in recent years several trends have called this assumption into
question.
First, mainstream depository institutions have acquired some of the most
notorious predatory lenders and currently operate those lenders as subsidiaries. For
instance, The Associates, which is now owned by Citigroup, has been accused of
pervasive predatory lending practices by the media, state attorneys general, and the
Federal Trade Commission.22 As a result, The Associates settled an action brought by
the North Carolina state attorney general under both state and federal theories of law for
$20 million.23 After stonewalling a federal investigation,24 The Associates reached a

furnishings, cars, or credit cards, there is less consensus on which terms and practices merit the label
predatory.
21

See, e.g., Comptroller of the Currency Administrator of National Banks, Guidelines for
National Banks to Guard Against Predatory and Abusive Lending Practices, Advisory Letter No. 2003-2,
at 1-2 (February 21, 2003) [hereinafter OCC Advisory Letter] (“[T]he OCC does not have reason to
believe that national banks or their operating subsidiaries (collectively referred to herein as “national
banks”) generally are engaged in predatory lending practices . . . .”).
22

See, e.g., Associates v. Troup, 778 A.2d 529, 537 (N.J. Super. 2001) (“Typically predatory
lenders take advantage of borrowers due to their lack of sophistication in the lending market, due to their
lack of perceived options for the loan based on discrimination or some other factor, or due to deceptive
practices engaged in by the lender that mislead or fail to inform the borrower of the real terms and
conditions of the loan. The record in this case indicates that this is consistent with what occurred in the
Troup transaction.”); Michael Hudson, Signing Their Lives Away: Ford Profits from Vulnerable
Consumers, in MERCHANTS OF MISERY 42, 42-50 (Michael Hudson, ed., 1996) (detailing legacy of
abusive lending by The Associates). Associates Launches $200B Loan Program, CHICAGO TRIBUNE,
Sept. 28, 2003, at 11.
23

The Associates to Refund $20 Million to North Carolina Mortgagors, 11(5) CONS. BANKR.
NEWS 7 (Oct. 18, 2001).
24

Paul Beckett, FTC Files Motion Against Citigroup In Lending Case, WALL ST. J., March 6,
2002, at B9 (“[T]he FTC said Citigroup has ‘effectively stalled’ in producing evidence for the discovery,
. . . . [and] refused to provide any documents created prior to March 6, 1998, ‘even though the FTC
intends to prove that the Associates' substantial and widespread illegal lending practices date back to at
least January 1, 1994.’”)
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predatory lending settlement for $215 million with the Federal Trade Commission.25
Although Citigroup promised to clean up its new subsidiary’s business practices,
allegations of predation have continued to dog the division.26 Civil and consumer rights
organizations still accuse Citifinancial of predatory lending.27 And, as recently as 2004
the Federal Reserve Board ordered Citigroup agreed to pay a 70 million dollar fine after
a three year investigation turned up additional violations by Citifinancial of the Home
Ownership and Equity Protection Act, the Equal Credit Opportunity Act and other
predatory lending laws.28

25

Erick Bergquist, FTC's Look At Subprime Industry Not Finished Yet, AMERICAN BANKER,
May 25, 2004, at 1. Absent possible preemption, these same deceptive practices would be actionable
under most state Unfair and Deceptive Acts and Practices statutes.
26

John Bamboa & David Glover, Viewpoints: To Get Citi to Change Ways, Regulators Need to
Do More, AM. BANKER, Sept. 27, 2002, at 9.
27

Id. (“[T]he largest settlement in . . . [the Federal Trade Commission’s] history [of $215
million] was hardly a slap on the wrist to Citigroup. The company has assets of over $1 trillion, so the
settlement represented a meaningless percentage of its assets – less than 0.1%. In fact, the settlement is
likely to have less of a deterrent effect than a $20 parking fine for a bank official earning $100,000 a
year.”).
28

Board of governors of the Federal Reserve System, In re Citgroup, Inc. and Citifiancial Credit
Company, Order to Cease and Desist and Order of Assessment of a Civil Money Penalty Issued Upon
Consent May 27 2004; Timothy L. O’Brien, Fed Assesses Citigroup Unit $70 Million in Loan Abuse,
N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 2004, at C1; Erik Berguist, Citi-Fed Pact on Subprime: Opening Act? AM.
BANKER, May 28, 2005, at 1.
Citigroup is by no means the only bank that has subsidiaries that have been accused of predatory lending.
Indeed, Household Finance Company is now owned by HSBC Holdings, which is the second largest
consumer finance organization in the U.S.—after Citigroup. Kathi Whitley, Household International,
Inc., HOOVERS ONLINE, available at
<http://premium.hoovers.com/subscribe/co/factsheet.xhtml?ID=10750> (viewed September 22, 2004).
Like The Associates, Household has a troubling legacy of predatory lending. A coalition of state
attorneys general forced Household into the largest predatory lending settlement ever—nearly half-abillion dollars. Jonathan Finer & Charles R. Babcock, The Lure of High-Risk Loans; Huge Profits Drive
Practice's Spread Despite Lawsuits, WASH. POST, July 12, 2004, at E01 (“In the past few years,
regulators and prosecutors have cracked down on some predatory lending practices. In 2002, Household
International Inc. agreed to pay borrowers $484 million, a few weeks after a division of Citigroup Corp.
settled a case with the Federal Trade Commission for $215 million.”); Editorial, Borrowed Trouble,
RALEIGH NEWS & OBSERVER, April 12, 2004, A10. Other examples allegations of predatory lending
against bank subsidiaries include: Maudline Smith v. Ameriquest and NationsCredit, Case No. 32879-02
(N.Y. Sup. Ct., County of Queens 2002) (subsidiary of Bank of America accused of fraud in origination
of home mortgage with balloon payment); Wells Fargo Home Mortgage v. Denise Brown et al. v. Peach
& Pep Construction Co., Case No. 00-CH-481 (Cir. Ct. St. Clair County, Ill.) (subsidiary of Wells Fargo
national bank accused of conspiracy to commit fraud and Truth in Lending violations).
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Second, many commentators have pointed to increasingly onerous and
deceptive pricing in mainstream banking products.29 As the lines between the fringe
and prime market have blurred, mainstream lenders have turned to terms and practices
which are gradually approaching a point at which reasonable independent observers
might describe as predatory. For example, there have been widespread complaints
about credit card default interest rates of more than thirty percent.30 Moreover, many
are skeptical of universal default terms where a late payment on a some other
obligation, such as the consumer’s rent or a medical bill can trigger the default interest
rate on a credit card which the consumer has always paid on time.31 Consumer
advocates complain of bait and switch advertising where credit card issuers unilaterally
change contract terms shortly after origination.32 Finally, increasing use of mandatory
arbitration clauses and waivers of the right to pursue remedies in a class action may
deprive consumers of a realistic opportunity to create case law inhibiting these sharp
practices.33 Collectively, these developments and others like them,34 have made many
mainstream banking products appear quite similar to financial agreements traditionally
found in the fringe market.
Third, for several years fringe and predatory lenders have sought to obtain their
own banking charters. And, in recent months, at least two appear to have succeeded in
doing so. Consumer advocates’ fears seem well grounded now that the Office of Thrift
Supervision has extended a thrift charter to H&R Block, the largest tax return preparer

29

Elizabeth Warren, Bankrupt Children, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1003, 1025-26 (2002) (discussing
impact of credit card debts on children of bankrupt consumers).
30

Kathy Chu, Sholdering Mega Credit Card Fees?, USA TODAY, Nov. 18, 2005, at 03B;
Kathleen Day & Caroline Mayer, Credit Card, Fees Bury Debtors; Senate Nears Action on Bankruptcy
Curbs, WASH. POST, March 6, 2005, at A1.
31

Patrick McGeehan, Plastic Trap—Debt That Binds: Soaring Interest Compounds Credit Card
Pain for Millions, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 2004, at A1.
32

Carolyn Carter, et al., The Credit Card Market and Regulation: In Need of Repair, 10 N.C.
BANKING INST. 23, 42 (2006).
33

Id. at 45-46.

34

Another troubling example are bounce protection plans on checking accounts that in effect
charge interest rates comparable to payday loans to consumers who over draw their checking account.
Owen B. Asplundh, Bounce Protection: Payday Lending in Sheep’s Clothing, 8 N.C. BANKING INST. 349,
350 (2004) . Consumer groups have complained that some banks charge bounce protection fees to
consumers withdrawing money at ATM machine who do not realize they are overdrawing their account.
Laura K. Thompson, Bank Overdraft Programs Rankle Consumer Groups, AM. BANKER, May 20, 2003
at 4.
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in the country.35 For years, consumer groups have been troubled by loan pricing and
inflated fees charged by H&R Block.36 They have accused H&R Block of deceptively
marketing its loan products as quick tax returns, rather than as low risk triple-digit
interest rate loans they are.37 Similarly, the largest pawn shop chain in the state of
Minnesota has successfully obtained an industrial loan charter.38 While industrial loan
corporations are something of an unusual breed of bank in most of the country, in the
few states which authorize them, including Minnesota, and especially Utah, the
favorable charters have facilitated non-depository institutions obtaining some of the
same interest rate exporting capabilities as depository lenders.39 Moreover, with the
likes of Wal-Mart pushing for its own industrial loan corporation, fringe lenders with a
history of predatory lending seeking the same thing may have an extremely powerful
ally.40
Finally, many banking institutions in the United States have not been shy about
using agents to originate and service predatory loans. Many of the most powerful fringe
credit businesses in the country have used the imprimatur of federal banking regulators
in making loans with interest rates over ten times the federal 45% per se evidentiary

35

Jody Shenn, H&R Block: As OTS Oks Charter Bid, Spitzer Sues, AM. BANKER, March 16,

2006, 1.
36

Damian Paletta, Tax Refund Loans Called Predatory, AM. BANKER, Feb. 1, 2002, 5; CHI CHI
WU, JEAN ANN FOX, AND ELIZABETH RENUART, TAX PREPARERS PEDDLE HIGH PRICED TAX REFUND
LOANS: MILLIONS SKIMMED FROM THE WORKING POOR AND THE U.S. TREASURY (Washington, D.C.,
Boston: Consumer Federation of America & National Consumer Law Center, January 31, 2002)
37

Much of the consumer group outrage over tax return loans stems from the fact that unlike
many consumer loans, these products are low risk since the tax preparer is certain to receive a tax return
check from the federal government. PETERSON, TAMING THE SHARKS, supra note , at 231-233. To the
extent that there is repayment risk it stems from the tax preparer’s own errors in preparing the consumer’s
return documents. Also, H&R Block has been criticized for skimming millions of dollars out of the
government’s earned income tax credit, the most important remaining poverty entitlement program
designed to lift children out of poverty. Apparently, these concerns did not deter the OTS from granting
H&R Block a federal banking charter and the preemption rights that go along with it.
38

Sheryl Jean, Pawnbroker to Banker? The Leading Provider of Payday Loans to Cash-strapped
Minnesotans Expands its Financial Services -- But Consumer Advocates Aren't Happy, ST. PAUL
PIONEER PRESS, April 2, 2006, 1D.
39

ILCs—A Review of Charter, Ownership, and Supervision Issues: Hearing Before the Subcom.
On Financial Institutions and Consumer Credit of the H. Comm on Financial Services, 109th Cong. (July
12, 2006) (providing summary of Industrial Loan Company banking powers).
40

See generally Kevin K. Nolan, Wal-Mart’s Industrial Loan Company: The Risk to Community
Banks, 10 N.C. Banking Inst. 187 (2006) (summarizing Wal Mart’s efforts to enter the banking industry).
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trigger for extortionate loan sharking.41 For years bank regulators facilitated predatory
payday lending by allowing both state and federal banks to make predatory payday
loans out of fringe lending company store fronts.42 It is true that the Officer of the
Comptroller of the Currency and now more equivocally the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation have used their regulatory discretion to curtail payday lending by banks
with the cooperation of fringe agents.43 Nevertheless, great damage was done to the
fabric of American consumer protection law in the interim. By allowing out of state
banks to make payday loans, local lenders could demand equal treatment from state
legislators undermining usury laws one legislature at a time all across the country.44
Meanwhile, at least for a time, fringe lenders with patron banks (with, in turn, a patron
bank regulator) profited without concerning themselves with these ugly state political
battles.
As a result of the foregoing trends, the assumption that the predatory lending
market has been served by non-depository creditors may no longer be legitimate. In
fact, the trends listed above demonstrate that as depository institutions begin to
participate in the fringe market and utilize practices that many consider to be predatory,
the lines between predatory fringe lending and traditional lending have become blurred.
B. Preemption in an Era of Consolidating Federal Power: The Case of Agents of
Depository Institutions
Collectively these trends, which all suggest that depository institutions may be
growing closer to fringe market players and practices, have set a troubling stage for
debates over federal preemption to play upon. Non-profit consumer advocacy
organizations have been highly critical of federal preemption, as have state attorneys
general. Consistent with these concerns, many commentators have worried that federal
preemption of various aspects of the consumer finance system would undermine
momentum needed for reform of consumer protection law. For example, Arthur
Wilmarth has argued that the OCC’s efforts to create field preemption are an illegal and

41

18 U.S.C. § 892(b)(2) (2006).

42

CONSUMER FEDERATION OF AMERICA & U.S. PUBLIC INTEREST RESEARCH GROUP, RENT-ABANK PAYDAY LENDING: HOW BANKS HELP PAYDAY LENDERS EVADE STATE CONSUMER PROTECTIONS
2 (Nov. 2001).
43

Annys Shin, On Payday, Many GIs Pay Back, WASH. POST, Sept. 11, 2006; Erick Bergquist,
FDIC Payday Stance May Narrow Field Further Still, AM. BANKER, March 17, 2005, at 1.
44

Steven M. Graves & Christopher L. Peterson, Predatory Lending and the Military: The Law
and Geography of “Payday” Loans in Military Towns, 66 OH. ST. L.J.653, 830 (2005).
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cynical power grab that will come at the expense of consumers.45 Bahir Azmy recently
argued that state level predatory mortgage lending reform is a positive example of the
laboratories of democracy in action.46 Robert Eager and C.F. Muckenfuss have
described how state predatory mortgage lending statutes created a vehicle for federal
banking regulators to issue orders preempting those statutes which gave an adumbrative
competitive advantage to federal institutions over their state chartered counterparts.47
Margot Saunders and Alys Cohen go so far as to suggest federal regulation is better
seen as a cause of predatory lending than a hedge against it.48 I have speculated that
because federal regulators are aware of state parity laws and the incentive of states to
protect their own institutions, perhaps efforts to preempt have more to do with a
deregulatory agenda than an effort to change the balance of power in the dual banking
system.49
Many in the banking industry, banking regulators in particular, have responded
with formidable arguments on the necessity of federal preemption. For example, Julie
Williams and Michael S. Bylsma from the OCC, have argued that federal preemption is
necessary in a an increasingly national financial services marketplace.50 They have also
pointed out that federal banking regulators have replaced state law and enforcement
with federal banking regulations that are sufficient to prevent consumer abuse.51
45

Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The OCC’s Preemption Rules Exceed the Agency’s Authority and
Present a Serious Threat to the Dual Banking System and Consumer Protection, 23 ANN. REV. BANKING
& FIN. L. 225 (2004).
46

Azmy, supra note , at 391.

47

Roger C. Eager & C.F. Muckenfuss, III., Federal Preemption and the Challenge to Maintain
Balance in the Dual Banking System, 8 N.C. BANKING INST. 21, 27-31 (2004).
48

Margot Saunders & Alys Cohen, Federal Regulation of Consumer Credit: The Cause or the
Cure for Predatory Lending?, Harvard University Joint Center for Housing Studies Working Paper
Series, BABC 04-21, at 17 (March 2004).
49

Peterson, Federalism and Predatory Lending, supra note ?, at 96-97. Indeed rules currently
under consideration by the FDIC appear to support this notion. The FDIC is considering moving to
restore balance in the dual banking system by simply loosening regulation on state banks to mirror the
immunity federally chartered institutions. If this approach works its way into the law, the result of
preemption will not be a competitive advantage for one group of financial institutions, but less consumer
protection overall without the nuisance of passing embarrassing congressional legislation.
50

Julie L. Williams & Michael S. Bylsma, Federal Preemption and Federal Banking Agency
Responses to Predatory Lending, 59 BUS. LAW. 1193, 1193 (2004) (“[T]oday’s credit and financial
markets are as national in scope as our highway system. Just as the value of a uniform interstate highway
system to support our nation’s commerce is well recognized, the value of a uniform national system for
provision of financial services is coming to be so.”).
51

Id.
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Moreover, federal regulators have expressed scepticism over whether federal banking
institutions have actually been involved in predatory practices.52 Credit rating
companies, such as Standard and Poor’s and Moody’s, have buttressed these arguments
by refusing to rate securities including loans from jurisdictions that adopt aggressive
anti-predator liability rules.53 Fringe lender trade associations have tried to polish their
public image by hiring expensive public relations, some of which have a track record of
creating phony grass roots organizations and smearing political opponents.54
A still emerging front in this national debate is whether banking regulators can
and should preempt state law with respect to non-bank agents of banking institutions.
By way of background, in recent years depository institutions have increasingly turned
to outside contractors to complete a variety of tasks associated with banking activity.55
For example, depository institutions have hired independent companies to conduct a
variety of routine banking functions such as data processing, accounting, maintaining
computer network security, and human resource administration.56 But depository
52

Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Economic Issues in Predatory Lending,
Unpublished OCC Working Paper, July 30, 2003, at 4 (on file with author).
53

See Natalie Abrams, et al., Standard and Poor’s Implements Credit Enhancement Criteria and
Revises Representation and Warranty Criteria for Including Anti-Predatory Lending Law Loans in U.S.
Rated Structured Finance Transactions, May 13, 2004, www.standardandpoors.com; Erick Bergquist,
Georgia Amended Predatory Law After Preapproval by S&P, AM. BANKER, March 11, 2003, at 1.
54

Compare Steven Schlein & Jay Leveton, For Immediate Release: Less Than 4 Percent of
Military Have Taken a Payday Advance Loan Says New Survey, Feb. 3, 2004 (on file with author) (press
release issued on behalf of payday lender trade association), with Glen Martin, Chemical Industry Told to
Get Tough: Lobbyist’s Memo Advises Hardball Tactics for Fighting Tighter California Regulations, SAN
FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, Nov. 21, 2003 (“‘They're known for creating deceptive, phony front groups,’
Walker said. ‘They go through people’s trash; they make a policy of hiring former FBI and CIA
operatives. Their motto basically is that they’re not a PR firm - you hire them when you want to win a
war.’ . . . Steven Schlein, a senior vice president with Nichols-Dezenhall, defended the firm’s tactics.
‘We may be aggressive in the service of our clients, but we never break the law,’ he said.”). See also
Eamon Javers, “The Pit Bull of Public Relations”: Eric Dezenhall serves clients such as ExxonMiobil by
Going After their Foes, BUSINESS WEEK, April 17, 2006 (“Journalist Bill Moyers, who tangled with
Dezenhall’s firm over a 2001 documentary about the chemicals industry says: ‘I consider them the Mafia
of industry.’”).
55

Lavonne Kuykendall, Market Changes, New Focus May Have Led NPC to Block, AM.
BANKER, June 2, 2004, 7 (discussing independent contractors in payment system banking); Jody Shenn,
A Strategy Fix for RBC Mortgage: New Compensation Structure Meant to Put Focus on Margins, AM.
BANKER, April 1, 2004, 1 (discussing industry practices with respect to loan origination).
56

Karen Gullo, Outsourcing Poses Dilema for Strategists, AM. BANKER, June 27, 1990, at 1;
James H. McKenzie & Jeb Britton, III, Should You Heed the Siren Song of Third-Party Firms, ABA
BANKING J., October 1996, at 99; Office of Thrift Supervision, Department of Treasury, Third Party
Arrangements, Thrift Bulletin TB 82a, at (Sept. 1, 2004).
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institutions have also increasingly outsourced many tasks involving interaction with
their customers, such as operating telephone call centers and bill paying services.57
Some depository institutions have also hired independent contractors for loan
brokering, loan servicing, real estate appraising, telemarketing, and direct mail
solicitation on behalf of the depository institution. 58
Depository institutions hire independent contractors to act as agents on behalf of
the institution for a variety of reasons. One advantage of using independent contractors
is avoiding sunk costs from excess labor capacity when business is slow. When
business picks up, depository institutions can quickly and flexibly respond through
independent contractors to whom the institution lacks a long-term commitment.
Independent contractors are also responsible for their own benefits and health care—an
increasingly important component of employee compensation in an era of skyrocketing
health care costs.59 Independent contractors that specialize in a particular banking
activity may also develop special expertise allowing them to complete tasks more
quickly and efficiently. Moreover, in an era of bank mergers and acquisitions, longterm commitments to employees can reduce the flexibility of the institutions as they
posture for the most advantageous capital structure.
However, one potential drawback of independent contractors has been
regulatory. As federal regulators have carved out protection for their constituent
institutions from state oversight and law, federal depository institutions found a
competitive advantage from avoiding the necessity of state licensing fees, state
inspections, and also (more controversially) the application of many state consumer
protection laws. This has created an issue of whether state law and regulatory authority
apply to independent contractors of federal depository institutions. On the one hand, an
independent contractor is just that: independent. Agents of depository institutions are
not themselves depository institutions. On the other hand, banking regulators have been
reluctant to force depositary institutions into less efficient capital structures for no good
reason. What difference should it make whether a bank or thrift conducts its marketing
or customer service through employees or through agents? Why should the latter be
subject to state law and authority when the former is not? Finding no source of concern
from these questions, federal banking regulators have taken a series of steps which

57

Office of Thrift Supervision, Department of Treasury, Third Party Arrangements, Thrift
Bulletin TB 82a, at (Sept. 1, 2004).
58

Orla O’Sullivan, The Profitability Riddle: We Know What it is Not, But Not What it is, ABA
BANKING J., February 1998, at 78.
59

Lee Conrad, Loan Muscle Wears a Tie Now, Works Phones, Makes $$: Market Shakeout
Leaves 20 Agencies as Major Players, and with little Bank Competition, They’re Going After a Mountain
of Late Debts. First Order of Business, Set Up Shop in India, U.S. BANKER, May 13, 2004, at 46.
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either explicitly or implicitly have allowed agents of depository institutions to attempt
to avoid state legal and regulatory authority under the guise of federal preemption.
To date, the OTS has made the most explicit effort to preempt state law and
oversight with respect to non-depository agents of a federal depository institution. In
October of 2004 the OTS general counsel office issued an opinion letter responding to
an inquiry from a federal savings association and its wholly owned subsidiary.60 The
thrift in question wanted to know whether independent agents it had hired to perform
marketing, solicitation and customer service on loan products were “subject to state
licensing or registration laws by reason of performing such activities on behalf of, and
as agents for, the Association.”61 The thrift in question had entered into contracts with
the independent businesses to market the thrift’s loans through direct mail, telephone
and personal contacts. The independent contractors also assisted loan applicants in
completing application forms, answering questions, forwarding completed applications
to the thrift, and other various customer service duties.62 The independent contractors
had exclusive representation arrangements where they did not provide similar services
to any other lender. They received compensation based on the number of transactions
actually consummated by the thrift.63 The source of controversy behind the opinion
letter was the fact that many states had required the independent contractors performing
mortgage brokering services to register, obtain licenses, and otherwise comply with the
state’s mortgage brokerage licensing statute.64
In response to the inquiry, the OTS reasoned that thrifts were entitled to the
freedom to make business decisions on how to conduct their operations.65 It explained
that thrifts should not be subject to state law simply because they chose to use an
independent contractor rather than one of their own employees.66 Still, the
administrative action is at least partially explained by the massive financial interest at
stake. According to an influential insurance industry trade publication, over fifty

60

Op. Chief Counsel, Office of Thrift Supervision, Authority of a Federal Thrift to Perform
Banking Activities through Agents Without Regard to State Licensing Requirements, P-2004-7 (October
25, 2004), available at 2004 OTS LEXIS 6 (hereinafter OTS, P-2004-7].
61

Id. at 1.

62

Id. at 2.

63

Id. at 3.

64

Id. at 4.

65

Id. at 11.

66

Id.
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insurance companies now own institutions with federal banking charters.67 The largest
of these insurance companies is State Farm, which owns State Farm Bank, a thrift
regulated by the OTS.68 Under the OTS opinion letter State Farm’s approximately
17,000 insurance agents—all of whom are already subject to state insurance law—are
purported to be free from state mortgage lending regulatory licensing and oversight in
marketing home mortgages to their insurance clients.69 In addition to significantly
decreasing State Farm’s regulatory oversight, the opinion also coincidentally increased
the power base of the OTS.
For its part, the OCC issued a similar regulatory preemption determination in
70
2001. While the OCC’s provision is rather less explicit in its reasoning, it makes up
for this in sheer chutzpah. The regulation purports to preempt the application of state
consumer protection law and authority to (of all businesses) used car dealerships where
they are acting as an agent of a national bank.71 While there is no question that car
dealerships provide an important, indispensable, and legitimate service to Americans,
there is also no denying that automobile sales present one of the most notoriously
treacherous personal finance situations faced by American consumers.72 The state
statute in question, the Michigan Motor Vehicle Sales Finance Act of 1950, a statute
dating back to the Truman administration, was designed to attempt to rein in some of
the abusive car dealership practices faced by Michigan residents. To this end, the
statute required that “a person shall not engage in this state as a[n] . . . agent” in “the
business of an installment seller of motor vehicles under installment sale contracts”
without a license. Car dealers in Michigan are also required to put up a bond to cover
liability to the state or consumers victimized by unlawful behavior,73 and to make
available their records to the state Financial Institutions Bureau.74 Moreover, the statute
67

State Farm Recieves Federal Bank Charter, BEST’S INS. NEWS, Dec. 16, 2004, available at
2004 WL 101010275.
68

State Farm Digging in Its Heels Over Regulatory Ruling BEST’S INS. NEWS, Dec. 17, 2004,
available at 2004 WL 101010325.
69

OTS, P-2004-7 at 14-15.

70

Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Preemption Determination, 66 FED. REG. 28593
(May 23, 2001) (hereinafter: OCC Car Dealership Preemption Letter).
71

Id.

72

See, e.g., Michael Feyen, Showroom Turncoat Comes Clean: Dirty Dealing Exposed, and how
not to get Taken to the Cleaners when Buying a Car, CAR & DRIVER, May 2006, at 94 (former salesman
discusses remorse over past behavior).
73

Mich. Comp. L. §492.105 (2005).

74

Id. at § 492.110.
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includes a variety of consumer protection provisions including price disclosures,75 the
prohibition of some potentially abusive contractual terms,76 rules attempting to prevent
unfair or coercive insurance sales in connection with car sales,77 and limits on the type
of junk fees dealers can charge.78 Finally, the statute also limits the interest rate on car
loans where a car dealer is itself offering the loan or is acting as a broker or agent for
the lender.79
The OCC’s ruling came about as a result of a dispute between National City
Bank, a national bank located in Ohio, which had entered into an agreement with a car
dealership in Michigan.80 Under the agreement the dealer was to serve as a limited
agent on behalf of the bank in soliciting car loans, taking applications, preparing loan
documentation, and closing the loans by obtaining the consumer’s signature on all the
required documents.81 National City Bank agreed to compensate the car dealer by
paying a commission on each loan closed.82 Under the contract, the bank had exclusive
authority to approve loans, but the dealership was free to charge interest rates in excess
of those required by the bank’s underwriting guidelines.83 Where customers agreed to
interest rates inflated beyond the bank’s risk-based underwriting standards, the bank
agreed to a kick-back, sometimes called a yield spread premium, to the dealer in
addition to the normal commission.84 Consumer advocates and scholars have criticized
this type of yield spread premium as one of the most important indicia of predatory
75

Id. at 492.113.

76

These provisions include acceleration clauses, clauses waiving legal rights, clauses granting
the dealership the power of attorney, and clauses waiving of assignee liability for the dealer’s unlawful
behavior. Id. at 492.114.
77

Id. at 492.116.

78

Id. at § 492.117, 492.131.

79

Id. § 492.118.

80

Michigan Financial Institutions Bureau, Department of Consumer and Industry Services, In the
Matter of: Request By Rodney D. Martin on Behalf of National City Bank for a Declaratory Ruling on
the Applicability of the Motor Vehicle Sales Finance Act to Certain Transactions, January 1, 2000
(Hereinafter: Michigan Financial Institutions Bureau Ruling); OCC Car Dealership Preemption Letter,
supra note ?, at 28593-28594.
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lending.85 In such arrangements the car dealer or mortgage broker receives
compensation in addition to a base commission in exchange for originating an “above
par” loan—that is, a loan with a higher interest rate than the borrower qualifies for
based on the lender’s own guidelines.86 Some empirical research suggests that minority
and women borrowers end up paying higher interest rates where a lender and its agent
sets up this type of relationship.87 Moreover, even when disclosed this type of
compensation is deceptive and confusing since the borrower rarely suspects that they
would actually be charged an extra fee for the privilege of a higher interest rate.88 Yield
spread premiums give the broker or dealer the flexibility to target unsophisticated or
trusting borrowers with sometimes ruinous prices, while still not losing borrowers who
are more responsive to price competition.
Rather than simply complying with the statute—like other lenders and car
dealers in Michigan—National City and its agent petitioned the Michigan State
Financial Institutions Bureau for a declaratory ruling stating that the law did not apply
to the bank, nor to the car dealership with whom it had contracted.89 Understandably the
Michigan agency refused to waive the application of the state motor vehicle installment
sales law to the car dealership simply because the dealer signed a contracted with an out
of state bank.90 In its ruling, the Bureau did not contest that National City Bank was
free to charge Ohio interest rates in direct loans to borrowers. Rather, the Bureau
reasoned that when a national bank originated loans through car dealerships—business
entities chartered, licensed, and regulated by the State and seemingly well beyond the
scope of the Riegle-Neal Act—those dealerships were nevertheless obliged to comply
with the commands of the Michigan legislature.91 After all, the Supreme Court has, at
least not yet, announced a “most favored used car dealer” doctrine.92
85

Predatory Mortgage Lending Practices: Abusive Use of Yield Spread Premiums: Hearing
before the U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 107th Cong. Part I (Jan.
2002) (prepared statement of Ira Rheingold); Brian Collins, Consumer Groups Still Pushing Hard on
RESPA, ORIGINATION NEWS, May 1, 2006, at 81.
86

PETERSON, TAMING THE SHARKS, supra note ?, at 142; Brian A. Wahl, Yield Spread Premium
Class Actions Under RESPA: Confusion Predominates, 19 REV. LITIG. 97, 98 n.1 (2000).
87

Howell E. Jackson & Jeremy Berry, Kickbacks or Compensation: The Case of Yield Spread
Premiums 3 (Jan. 8, 2002) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
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PETERSON, TAMING THE SHARKS, supra note ?, at 142.

89

Michigan Financial Institutions Bureau Ruling, supra note .
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Nevertheless, when National City Bank later asked the OCC for an opinion that
would circumvent the Michigan regulator’s decision, the OCC obliged. In making its
case the OCC began with the truisms that national banks are authorized to make loans
and to use agents in connection with their business.93 Moreover, the OCC pointed out
that under the Marquette Doctrine, national banks are free to charge interest rates in
accordance with the laws of the bank’s home state.94 From these three premises the
opinion letter concludes that
in our opinion, Federal law preempts the [Michigan Motor Vehicle Sales
Finance Act] . . . because the statute, as interpreted, conflicts with
Federal law authorizing the Bank to engage in the activities in question
and with the OCC’s exclusive visitorial powers over national banks.95
Aside from being something of a grating non-sequitur of the nails on chalkboard
variety, the letter never points to any specific statutory language from Congress
authorizing the OCC to prevent Michigan from imposing consumer protection law on
its car dealerships. Also noticeably absent from the OCC’s determination was any
mention of the arguably predatory yield spread premium based compensation National
City Bank intended for its car dealer/agent.
Given the potentially far-reaching annulment of cumbersome state consumer
protection law and regulatory oversight, it should come as no surprise that state
depository institutions have become envious of the immunity from state law enjoyed by
federal lenders. In 2005 the Financial Services Roundtable petitioned the FDIC to issue
a rule grant sweeping preemption of state law to state chartered banks. After a public
hearing on the subject, the FDIC issued a notice of rulemaking proposing to adopt
maintain licensure under the Act, but must endure that the installment sale transaction
that it is facilititating is conducted in full compliance with the Act. Where such agent
has facilitated the making of an installment sale contract and that transaction does not
comply with the Act, that agent may be subject to an administrative enforcement action
as well as any applicable criminal sanction.
Id.
92

Compare Tiffany v. National Bank of Missouri, 85 U.S. 409 (1873) (announcing the “most
favored lender doctrine” in interpreting Section 85 of the National Bank Act).
93

OCC Car Dealership Preemption Letter, supra note , at 28595 (“First, section 24(seventh)
specifically authorizes national banks to make loans. . . . Second, the authority of national banks under
section 24 (seventh) permits a national bank to use the services of agents and other third parties in
connection with a bank’s lending business.”).
94

Id. (“Finally, under 12 U.S.C. § 85, national banks may charge interest in accordance with the
laws of the state where the bank’s main office is located without regard to where the borrower resides and
despite contacts between the loan and another state.”)
95

Id.
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much of the policy suggested by the roundtable. At the time of this writing, the FDIC
has not yet acted on the proposed rules.96 Like previous actions by the OTS and OCC,
the FDIC’s proposed rules will inevitably force the agency to take a position on
preemption with respect to agents of state banks. For now at least, the FDIC’s proposed
rules do not specifically address whether preemption will also apply to independent
contractors of state banks. Rather the proposed rules make preemption for out-of-state,
state banks coextensive with the preemption given to national banks. The proposed rule
states:
[A]n out-of-State, State bank that has a branch in a host State may
conduct any activity at such branch that is permissible under its home
state law if it is either:
(1) Permissible for a bank chartered by the host State, or
(2) Permissible for a branch in the host State of an out-of-State,
national bank.97
Because under the FDIC’s proposed rules preemption for state banks are coextensive
with preemption for national banks, as determined by the OCC, it would seem that
given the OCC’s ruling on agents, the proposed FDIC rules preempt the application of
state law to state licensed agents of an out-of-state, state bank.
Even more puzzling, if the proposed FDIC rules are adopted, it would seem that
the consumer protection laws of a state bank’s own state will not apply to independent
bank agents otherwise licensed by that state. After all, virtually all states have wild card
parity laws for their own state chartered banks.98 These rules purport to give every
power to local banks that out-of-state banks have under federal law. Thus, assuming the
FDIC goes through with its proposed rules, unless a court refuses to play the music as
written, banking regulations when synthesized with state law will allow any depository
institution to engage any independent contractor to make and service loans with
96

Perhaps it is waiting for vacancies on its commission before acting. One might wonder
whether potential political fallout from the action in an election year beset by political problems for the
administration might have something to do with the delay as well. The proposed FDIC rules have put
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immunity from state oversight and consumer protection law.99 Who could have
foreseen the bickering and mischief made inevitable when the Supreme Court first
picked its “most favorite” lender?100
As of yet, the judicial branch has not yet taken a clear position on whether
federal preemption extends to independent agents of depository institutions. But
eventually this issue must work its way into the courts. When it does there will be
occasion for careful reflection on the advisability of the regulators’ position. Obviously
the text of the Riegle-Neal Act and Congressional intentions with respect to the agents
of depository institutions will play the central role in this litigation. Nevertheless, courts
(and banking regulators) must interpret Congressional statutes with a sanguine eye on
the actual policy implications of their decisions. In the next section, I describe how
agency cost theory which may hold some insight in analyzing this question.
III. AGENCY COST THEORY
The complexity of agency relationships has created a fertile field for legal and
economic analysis.101 Both a principal and an agent form an agency relationship
because they each expect to receive some net benefit. The parties expect that the
relationship will lead to an efficient division of labor. Thus, a principal might benefit
from the greater expertise of an agent, such as where shareholders of a corporation hire
managers to skillfully oversee their ownership interest in the firm. Similarly, agency
relationships allow investment in many different productive enterprises allowing those
with wealth to diversify their holdings, insulating them from unforeseeable risks
99

Presumably state laws that have only an incidental relationship to a bank or thrifts authorized
powers would not be preempted. But, we might translate this into “state laws are not preempted, unless
they actually protect a consumer from something.” This is small consolation indeed.
100

In Tiffany v. National Bank of Missouri, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 409 (1873) the Supreme Court
asserted that national banks are “national favorites.” Id. at 413. This label subsequently evolved into a
“most favored lender” doctrine. Marquette, 439 U.S. at 314.
101

Economists have generally used a far more inclusive definition of agency relationships than
does the law. For example, Stephen Ross defined agency relationships as arising “between two (or more)
parties when one, designated as the agent, acts for, on behalf of, or as representative for the other,
designated the principal in a particular domain of decision problems.” Stephen A. Ross, The Economic
Theory of Agency: The Principal’s Problem, 63 AM. ECON. REV. 134, 134 (1973). For economists, even
contractual arrangements between an employer and employee are sometimes viewed through the lense of
agency cost theory. Id. This article does not intend to contribute to economic agency theory as such, nor
does it hope to examine every conceivable agency relationship as broadly construed that might arise
within the context of financial institutions. Rather, it hopes to mine agency cost theory for useful insights
on the question of extending federal preemption of state law for independent contractors of depository
institutions.
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inherent in any one given venture. Sometimes principals seek agents where the
principal recognizes, ex ante, the potential for some non-welfare maximizing behavior,
such as when a parent creates a spendthrift trust for a child.102 Even where a principal
has greater capabilities with respect to a task than an agent, the principal may also have
higher opportunity costs, and thus capture a Pareto gain from the agents’s relatively
inexpensive labor.
Despite these obvious advantages, agency relationships also come with
significant costs. One of the central insights of economic agency cost theory over the
past generation is that while an agency relationship may be relatively efficient in
comparison to no relationship at all, the incentives of a principal and her agent
nevertheless are frequently (if not always) misaligned.103 Principals virtually never
enjoy representation of an agent with the same cost-to-benefit ratio for expending
resources on the completion of a given productive task. For example, in the classic
corporate context, the manager of a company who has no wealth invested in the
corporation she manages will have relatively little incentive to carefully manage
corporate funds in comparison to the shareholders of that corporation.104 Similarly,
because a real estate agent receives only a percentage of the purchase price of a home,
he has less incentive to invest time driving up the marginal sale price than the actual
seller the agent represented.105
Social norms, business practices, contract terms, and the legal system often
attempt to more closely align the incentives of agents and their principals. When a
stranger at the beach asks another to watch his belongings, most people will invest
some care and attention for those belongings even at a cost to themselves. Shareholders
expect CEOs and other corporate managers to carefully and transparently document the
expenditure of corporate resources to facilitate oversight. A real estate broker contract
which provides a bonus for obtaining a large sale price might mitigate some of the
agent’s incentive to shirk his duties.106 And, the law holds a trustee liable to his
beneficiaries for losses sustained from reckless or unauthorized investments.107 Indeed,

102
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so entrenched is the notion of the need to keep the incentives of agents and principals
aligned that the law frequently holds principals liable for the misdeeds of an agent.108
For a person or business to decide whether or not to contract with an agent, she
must weigh the expected benefits of that relationship against its potential costs.
Economic agency cost theory can assist in analyzing and quantifying those costs.
Perhaps the most influential model of agency costs, first established by Jensen and
Meckling, defines them as the sum of three variables.109 Thus agency costs are equal to:
(1) the monitoring expenditures of the principle,
(2) the bonding expenditures by the agent, and
(3) the residual loss.110
The first type of agency cost is expenditures by the principal in monitoring the
agent. By monitoring costs, economists usually imply not only observing the behavior
of the agent, but also “efforts on the part of the principal to ‘control’ the behavior of the
agent through budget restrictions, compensation policies, operating rules, etc.”111
Sometimes commentators divide this class of agency cost into external and internal
monitoring.112 With respect to the former, investors in a firm might hire accountants to
periodically audit the books of a venture to deter inefficient allocation of resources by
managers. Or with respect to the latter, a homeowner might purchase a newspaper and
read the classified listings to discover whether her realtor is advertising the home as
promised.
The second class of agency costs are usually labeled “bonding expenditures.”
By this, economists refer to situations where the principal will pay the agent to expend
resources to guarantee that the agent will not take actions that harm the principal.113 A
bonding cost is incurred where the principal pays a premium to the agent to create some
pool of resources or a legal obligation from which the principal can be compensated for
detrimental actions of the agent. Thus, where a legal client hires an attorney for
representation, a portion of the client’s legal fees are diverted by the attorney into
108
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malpractice insurance premiums. If the attorney takes actions inconsistent with the
interests of her principal that amount to malpractice, the principal will have a relatively
certain pool of funds available for compensation.
Bonding can serve as a substitute for monitoring costs and vice versa. A certain
bonding expenditure may decrease the marginal expected utility of monitoring
expenditures. Moreover, inability to bond might signal a need to invest additional
resources in monitoring. Thus, a testator might reject an estate planning attorney who is
uninsurable since the bonding expenditure associated with the malpractice premium is a
particularly worthwhile investment in protecting against potentially catastrophic losses
associated with negligent estate planing. But, perhaps more importantly, the
uninsurability of the attorney sends a troubling signal from insurance companies—
parties that specialize in monitoring and spreading this type of risk. The goal of the law
in this respect should be to create incentives that encourage an optimal mix of the
two.114
The final class of agency costs is the principal’s lost welfare caused by the
divergence in her interests from the those of her agent. If because of circumstances such
as technology, geography, or even personalities involved, an agent cannot be perfectly
monitored or bonded, then we should expect that the interests of the principal and the
agent will not be coextensive. This remaining pocket of diverging interests is generally
called the “residual loss” associated with agency.115 A client might monitor her attorney
by calling regularly to ask about the status of a case. The parties might make bonding
expenditures by taking a portion of her and other client’s fees and allocating them for
malpractice insurance. But, she can only call so often, before the attorney will no longer
pay attention to her demands—creating a diminishing marginal return from time
invested in this form of monitoring. And, malpractice insurance policies cannot be
continually renegotiated to cover every possible outcome harmful to the client. The
malpractice insurance might cover catastrophic negligence, but it will not compensate
the client for an attorney whose mind wanders while preparing a brief, leading to less
than hoped for actual legal work product per billed hour. Despite the client’s best
monitoring and bonding expenditures, the attorney who enjoys daydreaming whilst on
the clock retains her incentive to work more slowly. The client cannot easily discover
the less the than fully effective service allowing the attorney to capture a windfall when
compared to the parties’ contract. This windfall—the residual loss—is an agency cost
the client must consider in comparing the benefit of an agent to its opportunity cost.
It is at least theoretically possible that a principal could create a fee structure to
proportionally compensate the agent for the value of each action taken. But, to achieve
this fee-to-act compensation structure, the value of each action taken by the agent
114
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would need to be “completely known” to the principal.116 In the real world, obtaining
this information, and negotiating the contractual terms of this contract is highly
unlikely—particularly given that at some point marginal investment in monitoring will
be offset by decreases in the agent’s productivity. Thus, the distraction from a client
calling her attorney once an hour to make sure she is on task might take up more of the
attorney’s time than the daydreaming the client is concerned about. Rational principals
will expend effort on monitoring and bonding until their marginal price of doing so is
less than the expected benefit. High monitoring and bonding costs may explain why so
many agency relationships lack fee-to-act payment structures. A six percent
commission has been nearly universal for real estate agents. And, legal clients rarely
give their counsel bonuses for highly productive billable hours. In the real world,
residual loss often is often the dominant agency cost.
In policing agency relationships, the legal system is not only concerned about
aligning the incentives of principals and agents. Perhaps even more prominent are the
policies addressing third parties affected by a principal’s agent. It is true that agency
law affords damages to a principal from an agent who by illegally shirking his duties
has harmed the principal. Yet, an old and oft-disputed stew-pot of litigation focuses on
the extent to which principals can be held liable for the behavior of their agents that is
harmful to others.117 This harmful behavior may be unintentional—a result of
accidental behavior just as likely to occur had the principal acted without an agent. But,
the harmful behavior might also have a causal link to the agency relationship itself.
Sometimes agency relationships facilitate harmful and inefficient behavior.
Returning to our example of a client and her lawyer, suppose that the client for
nefarious purposes hopes to intentionally inflict some harm on a third party. She might
physically assault her victim, but doing so would invite punishment from the state. She
might say hateful things to the victim, but unlike sticks and stones, words may not
achieve the desired result. An attorney, however, might be capable of using words in a
special way to enlist the state in harming the victim. Thus, the client might turn to an
agent—a seasoned and cynical litigator with experience in using the machinery of law
to impost costs on others—to maliciously sue her victim for no good reason. Rational,
self-interested parties to the agency relationship could both benefit: the client gets
satisfaction and the attorney gets paid.118 The law however, considers the interests of
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the third party and will impose a penalty on both the lawyer and the client for misusing
its process.119 For us, the important point is that agency relationships—when left
unchecked—can be used to capture an agent’s comparative advantage in both socially
beneficial and socially destructive behavior. With the behavior of agents, as with all
human behavior, the law must create a regime of rules and procedure to sort out
acceptable from unacceptable acts. Agency cost theory does not alter this imperative.
We should expect Pareto dominated outcomes and great injustice, where agents
specialize in illegitimate, yet profitable, acts that principals cannot themselves
perform—or at least cannot perform without getting caught.
IV. BANK AGENTS AND PREEMPTION IN AN ERA OF PREDATORY LENDING: AGENCY
COSTS AND THE INCENTIVE TO FOREGO PREDATORY BEHAVIOR
Although an agent and its principal both expect that their respective expected
utility will exceed their costs, they do not necessarily share the same incentive structure
vis-a-vis the third parties and the government. Thus, in the case of consumer lending, it
could be that a depository institution itself will have a greater incentive to avoid
predatory behavior than will an agent of that institution. In this section, I argue that
both consumer financial services law and the capital structure of that industry suggest at
least three compelling reasons why bank agents are likely to be less averse to predatory
lending then the banks they represent.
First, agents of depository institutions are likely to be relatively less concerned
about damage to their reputation from allegations of predatory lending. Unlike its
agents, banks have significant sunk costs invested in public perception of their business.
Much of a bank’s customer base is the result of its image and brand identity in its target
market.120 To this end, banks spend significant resources in advertising and community
relations. Banks tend to have high profile roles in their communities. On this point,
Landes and Posner persuasively explained consumers purchase something of significant
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value when contracting with brand name firms.121 The argument is that consumers
recognize higher profile firms have unrecoverable sunk costs, and are willing to pay a
premium for the greater assurances associated with a brand name.122 When purchasing
complex financial services where the consumer does not understand the terms of an
agreement, there is no substitute for trust. Even in an era of deposit insurance, it also
takes significant trust to leave one’s money with a bank. Indeed this is why banking
regulators uniformly consider reputational threats to be an important component of
safety and soundness, even where that reputational threat may not pose a short term
threat to deposit insurance funds. After all, when a car dealership is accused of cheating
consumers, people may or may not be surprised; but when a national bank is accused of
cheating, it makes the evening news. This is not to say agents of depository institutions
will be completely indifferent to reputational harm, but rather that they are unlikely to
care as much as the depository institution itself. Accordingly, other things being equal,
agents of depository institutions will be marginally more averse to the reputational risks
associated with predatory lending.
Second, agents of depository institutions are likely to have less assets exposed
to liability than depository institutions themselves. The primary deterrent to predatory
lending in the American legal system is the risk of compensating victims for damages
they have sustained. Indeed the threat of damages is the primary tool enforcing most
law in our system. This is why the growing trend of judgment proof commercial
enterprises, particularly higher risk enterprises, is such a troubling development. Lynn
Lopucki has exposed a variety of strategies firms use to avoid compensating judgment
creditors.123 The shared theme of each of these strategies is separating the liability
generating component of a business from the assets used to fund and obtained from the
activity. Several commentators have pointed out that many predatory lenders depend on
sheltering their assets from victims to remain viable.124 This, at least in part, helps
121
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explain the extraordinary number of bankruptcies amongst subprime home mortgage
lending firms in the 1990s.125
However, at least one major participant in the economy has not yet been able to
judgment proof its operations—at least when undertaken within its own firm structure:
the depository institution. Unlike other firms and individuals, depository institutions
face stiff public capital requirements associated with protecting deposit insurance
funds. Banks must be cautious in engaging in predatory behavior because if a victim
succeeds in obtaining damages, unlike an increasing number of businesses, the bank
must actually pay. In contrast, agents of banks may be much more likely to declare
bankruptcy in the face of significant predatory lending liability. And, if the profits of
that predatory lending have already been distributed to shareholders, management, and
secured creditors, predatory lending victims will have no remedy.126 Moreover, unlike
banks which face significant entry and exit costs, independent contractors such as
mortgage brokerages, car dealerships, loan servicing companies and the like face
virtually no entry or exit costs, since they require only minimal overhead, equipment,
and financial reserves. It is far easier for these businesses to simply slip out of existence
once the heat for predatory practices is turned up. Unlike depository institutions,
independent contractor agents of depository institutions have a relatively greater
incentive to evolve into predatory specialists with a low-asset, judgment proof, fly-bynight capital structure.
Finally, despite the best intentions of banking regulators, it is inevitable that
independent contractor agents of depository institutions will receive less scrutiny than
depository institutions themselves. This is because, unlike consumer agency
administrators, attorneys general, and the plaintiffs’ bar, the primary mission of banking
regulators is to preserve the safety and soundness of the depository institutions they
oversee. In a world of scarce resources, banking regulators will always be forced to
make difficult choices about where and how they spend their supervisory efforts.
Independent contractors of depository institutions will always rank low in priority with
respect to threats posed to deposit insurance funds. Moreover, many independent
contractors may be more difficult to supervise than depository institutions. For
example, car dealerships are often located in out of the way places, may lack the
technology and record keeping to facilitate quick auditing, and—at least in some parts
of the country—may have business cultures resistant to oversight by the U.S. Treasury
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Department. Moreover, because independent agents of depository institutions receive
neither a their charter nor permission to expand from banking regulators, regulators
may be surprised to find how little leverage they have over these non-bank actors. All
together, we should expect that these factors will systematically impede the ability of
banking regulators to keep a close eye on independent contractors. Other things being
equal, federal regulators relative deterrence against predatory behavior will be
marginally less for independent contractor agents than the depository institutions those
agents serve.
The implications of agents’ lower incentive to avoid predation are further
illuminated when one considers the possibility of vicarious liability. If we assume that a
bank or thrift cannot be held liable for the illegal predatory behavior of its agent, then a
rational, profit-maximizing bank would simply outsource predatory behavior whenever
that behavior is profitable. For consumers this is clearly the worse alternative of the two
possible rules.127
But even if the depository institution will be held liable for its agent’s predation,
the residual loss cost of agency suggest that the agent will still retain a predatory
incentive. Take as an example an agency relationship between a car dealership and a
national bank similar to that involved in the OCC’s determination to preempt state law
with respect to agents of national banks. Since the bank will be liable for its agent’s
practices, we can expect it to use monitoring and bonding expenditures to reduce the
risk that the agent will seek to maximize its profit through illegal behavior. Liability
should be a robust deterrent for the bank since it values its reputation, it has high exit
and entry costs into the marketplace, and public asset requirements guarantee that the
bank has significant resources to loose if exposed to the wrath of an indignant jury.
Still, the profits to be had from using a car dealer as a marketing and delivery vehicle
for its loans could be too tempting to pass up. We would expect that the bank would
attempt to monitor the car dealership by regularly auditing the dealership’s books, by
conducting due diligence on the dealership’s reputation and financial stability, and by
retaining the right to make key decisions with respect to loan approval. A risk averse
bank might even require that the dealership maintain a modest cash collateral account
in escrow to compensate the bank for any liability it incurs from the agent.
Still, the car dealership gets paid only by closing loans, giving it an incentive to
close as many loans as possible—even ones where the borrower may not actually
qualify for a loan, or where the borrower may not actually agree to the loan being
offered. The dealer has an incentive to overestimate the credit worthiness of the
borrower by padding the borrower’s reported income. Similarly, the dealer has an
incentive to obtain the borrower’s signature by hiding or misrepresenting the true cost
127
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of the loan. Such risks are far from theoretical. Rather they make up the core of the
thousands of consumer protection cases involving car dealerships, mortgage brokers,
and consumers.
The incentive structure of the dealer is even further misaligned where the dealer
is compensated with a yield spread premium, as it was in the National City Bank
petition acted upon by the OCC. In such contracts the bank obtains a monitoring
advantage of knowing that the dealer will try to get the greatest return possible on the
bank’s assets. But, this return may or may not be a legal return. In a democratic society,
banks and car dealers must not discriminate in the prices they charge based on
impermissible protected classes. Doing otherwise is a violation of the Equal Credit
Opportunity Act (as well as the Fair Housing Act in the case of home mortgages).128
But even absent discrimination, yield spread premiums are an invitation to loan brokers
to commit fraud, to commit deceptive practices, and violate the Truth-in-Lending Act
since consumers must somehow be enticed into agreeing to a contract with a value
lower than the consumer’s opportunity cost. By definition, no rational consumer will
agree to pay a higher interest rate than he or she qualifies for from the very lender with
whom they contracted. Yield spread premium compensation is contingent upon an
irrational contract. Where a broker or dealer specializes in obtaining consumer
signatures on contracts that are against the consumers own best interests, we should
expect fraud, deception, and obscured disclosure.
This analysis exposes a troubling paradox in the recent public policy advocacy
of depository institutions and federal banking regulators. With one hand banks and their
regulators are attempting to distance themselves from their proxies. Frequently in
predatory lending cases involving a lender and an independent contractor of that
institution, consumers will propose joint liability theories seeking to hold the depository
institution liable for the behavior of its agent. Without variation, in these cases the
lenders characterize their agents as autonomous and independent so that the wrongful
actions of the one cannot be attributed to the other.129 Thus when a bank takes a home
mortgage on assignment from a table-funded mortgage broker, it is likely to claim that
it lacked notice of any fraud by the broker. Thus, the bank preserves its status as a
holder in due course.130 Or, when a bank makes an automobile loan to a consumer
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through a car dealer agent, the bank will refuse to accept responsibility for the fraud,
deception, and obscured disclosure of the dealership.131
Yet with the other hand depository institutions and federal banking regulators
are attempting to characterize their proxies as virtually indistinguishable from
themselves. In the debate over preemption of state law with respect to agents, banking
regulators have characterized the legal boundaries between a depository institution and
its non-bank agent as merely a choice about capital structure with little or no bearing on
the commercial reality of the transactions in which the agent will engage. Thus in its
opinion on preemption of state law with respect to independent contractors of thrifts the
OTS explained:
[F]ederal savings associations have the freedom to make business
decisions about the manner in which they will conduct their operations.
This includes decisions as to how to market and offer the association’s
products and services, and how to best facilitate customer access to, and
applications for, such products and services. An association’s decision as
to how to conduct its operations and market its products and services
should not result in the association being subject to a hodgepodge of
state requirements. An association should not be hamstrung in the
exercise of its authorized power merely because it chooses to market its
products and services using agents whose activities the association
closely monitors and controls.132
The use of the word “merely” seems rather befuddling given that the agency had just
used the federal thrift statutes to preempt state law for people who are not thrifts. But
what may be more, the profoundly different predatory incentives of a thrift in
comparison to its independent contractor suggest a concrete and fundamental economic
reason why preemption should not extend beyond the federally chartered depository
institution itself.
Certainly the extent to which a depository institution will have notice of and
control over the predatory behavior of an independent agent will depend on the facts of
each circumstance. But then, is this not an argument against preempting state law with
respect to independent agents? State governments have the ability to experiment with
different approaches in designing rules to ferret out which types of contracts and which
types of agents are more likely to engage predatory behavior than their depository
masters.133 State governments have the geographic flexibility to more accurately
131
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respond to the wide variations in the severity of credit fraud in different states. State
governments are more likely to have a vested local political interest in responding to the
needs of consumers affected by predatory lending. State governments are more likely to
have an infrastructure in place that is capable of dealing with car dealers, mortgage
brokers, loan services and other agents than federal banking regulators with limited
legislative missions, limited funding, and limited personnel. Returning to the OCCs
agent preemption determination, are the two small OCC offices in Detroit and Iron
Mountain really prepared to police the consumer credit practices of the Michigan’s
1,930 licensed motor vehicle installment sellers134—including those with confidence
inducing names like “The Used Car Factory,”135 “ACE Used Cars of Muskegon,”136
and “Ultimate Value Auto Sales”?137
V. CONCLUSION
By attempting to extend preemption to the agents of depository institutions,
banking regulators have removed from state regulation complex, unpredictable, and
potentially harmful relationships. The shifting incentives of agents have confounded
scholars, regulators, and judges—not to mention economists—in a tremendous cross
section of legal relationships. Even with the most carefully devised monitoring and
bonding expenditures, independent agents cannot be expected to always act in the
interests of the depository institutions they represent. It is less likely that independent
agent’s interests, even when constrained by monitoring and bonding, will happen to
coincide with the welfare of the American people.
At a minimum, the agency costs associated with depository institution agents
suggests that if we as a country go forward with preemption for these actors, it is
absolutely essential that the fabric of state legal and administrative protections be
replicated on a federal level. Currently, there is no credible federal legal or regulatory
strategy which can deter the agents of federal depository institutions at least with
134
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respect to the problems posed by predatory lending. There is no federal usury law to
check the outrageous prices of payday loan banking agents. There is no serious federal
predatory mortgage lending law. There is no private cause of action for the Federal
Trade Commission Act to enforce the FTC’s regulations on unfair and deceptive trade
practices. For their part, federal banking regulators have not flinched even as credit card
interest rates have crept closer and closer to the federal per se extortionate loan
sharking trigger of the Consumer Credit Protection Act.138 Even well-settled and long
established federal consumer protection statutes, such as the Truth in Lending Act, are
in a state of shameful disrepair.139 And finally, there are simply far too few federal
regulators to monitor the agents of depository institutions.
Furthermore, policy makers must accept the reality that if the legal system
grants agents of federal depository institutions immunity from state law, it will create a
potentially irresistible incentive for states to follow suit. If federal depository
institutions can outsource their special legal status along with their operations, state
depository institutions and the regulators that derive their revenue and power from
them, will inevitably clamor for the same treatment. The floor must not be lowered for
agents of federal depository institutions, lest the floor be lowered for agents of all
depository institutions.
The regulatory apparatus of the United States has not yet demonstrated the
capability of successfully regulating the abusive and predatory practices of depository
institutions themselves. To suggest with hardly a quiet breath of authorization from the
Congress, that federal banking regulators can be trusted to also police actors lending
through a tenuous, shifting, volatile agency relationship borders on the absurd. Indeed,
it leads one to suspect that these regulators have no intention of policing that
relationship at all. And therein lies a final ironic twist: perhaps the more fundamental
principal-agent monitoring failure lies in the inability of the American people to
successfully monitor their agents charged with overseeing the nation’s banking
industry.
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